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Do University Presidents Make a Difference? 





Although the general consensus is that university presidents do not 
make a difference, most research on this issue is atheoretical and percep-
tual in nature. Consequently, I draw on strategic leadership theory to 
examine whether observable experiences of presidents affected the adop-
tion of retrenchment (early faculty retirement) plans among Ontario uni-
versities from 1989-90 to 1997-98. In doing so, I also advance strategic 
leadership theory by introducing novel measures of leaders' observable 
experiences and by testing their impact on an outcome (retrenchment) in a 
noncorporate setting. Since early faculty retirement plans have spread 
across universities, and since evidence indicates that they combine finan-
cial benefits and academic costs, their adoption represents a key structural 
change begging for explanation. Although the literature attributes the 
adoptions to uncontrollable forces, I report that presidents play a major 
role in the adoptions. Those who lack seats on corporate boards, who have 
non-business or non-economics backgrounds, who are male, and who are 
recruited externally adopt the plans at lower rates than their respective 
counterparts. The results portray presidents as exercising circumscribed 
agency, strategizing on the basis of their personal and professional experi-
ences and making a difference even under inhospitable circumstances. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Bien que tous s'accordent à dire que les présidents d'université ne 
font aucune d i f fé rence , la p lupar t des recherches à ce suje t sont 
a théor iques et de nature perceptuel le . Je puise dans la théorie du 
leadership stratégique pour examiner si les pratiques observables des 
présidents affectent l 'adoption des programmes de réduction (retraite 
anticipée du corps professoral) dans les universités ontariennes entre 
1989-90 et 1997-98. De plus, en faisant cela, je présente la théorie du 
leadership stratégique en introduisant des mesures innovatrices des 
pratiques observables des présidents et en mesurant leur impact -sur les 
résultats des réductions dans un cadre non corporatif . Puisque les 
programmes de retraite anticipée du corps professoral se sont propagés à 
travers les universités, et puisque les preuves établissent un lien entre les 
gains financiers et les coûts académiques, leur adoption représente un 
changement structurel clé qui nécessite des explications. Bien que les 
ouvrages attribuent l 'adopt ion des programmes à des mouvements 
incontrôlables, je rapporte que les présidents jouent un rôle primordial 
dans ces adoptions. Les présidents qui ne siègent pas à un conseil 
d'administration, ceux qui ne possèdent aucune expérience des affaires 
commerciales ou économiques, ceux qui sont des hommes ou ceux qui 
sont recrutés de l'extérieur adoptent le programme à un taux inférieur à 
leurs homologues respectifs. Les résultats présentent les présidents 
administrant des instruments déterminés par une stratégie basée sur leurs 
e x p é r i e n c e s p e r s o n n e l l e s et p r o f e s s i o n n e l l e s m ê m e dans des 
circonstances inhospitalières. 
Although the issue of whether university presidents make a differ-
ence has been debated for decades, most researchers (Birnbaum, 1989b; 
Cohen & March, 1974; Dennison & Gallagher, 1986; Sibley, 1993) con-
clude that presidential powers are circumscribed greatly. However, 
nearly all of the research lacks grounding in a formal theory (Birnbaum, 
1989a) and relies on the perceptions of campus figures (Levin, 1992). 
Seeking more definitive conclusions about presidential power, I use 
strategic leadership theory (Boeker, 1997; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
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1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) to analyze whether observable experi-
ences of presidents influenced the adoption of retrenchment (early fac-
ulty retirement) programs among Ontario universities from 1989-90 to 
1997-98. Adoption of these programs has become common over the past 
decade (Gwyn, 1996; "Making the transition," 1992; Melchers, 1998; 
Peters, 1995; "Summary," 1993) and indications are that this activity has 
generated negative consequences, including larger and more impersonal 
classrooms, overworked faculty with low morale, and deteriorating acad-
emic quality ("Making large classes work," 1992; McGaw, 1993; "Tips 
and techniques," 1991). So the adoptions constitute a key structural 
change among universities that combines potential economic gains and 
educational losses, raising the provocative question: Are these adoptions 
affected by presidential orientations or are they driven by pressures 
beyond presidents' control, as the literature proposes (Gumport, 1993; 
Lorimer, 1993; Melchers, 1998; Neumann, 1995; Peters, 1995; 
Slaughter, 1993; "The thorny problem," 1990)? Addressing this question 
also provides an opportunity to advance strategic leadership theory, 
which emphasizes the relationship between three characteristics reflec-
tive of leaders' observable experiences — tenure, functional back-
ground, and formal education — and outcomes among corporations 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Recognizing the need to expand the set 
of leader experiences and populations that have been explored, I intro-
duce novel measures of leader experiences in explaining an outcome 
(retrenchment) in the educational sector. 
In section I, I review the literature on presidential power, and in 
section II, I discuss the concept of retrenchment and its history among 
Ontario universities. In the next two sections, I present a strategic lead-
ership theory of retrenchment and the methodology used to test the the-
ory. Section V reports that presidents play a key role in the adoption of 
retrenchment schemes. Those who lack seats on corporate boards, who 
have non-business or non-economics backgrounds, who are male, and 
who are external appointments adopt early faculty retirement packages 
at lower rates than their respective counterparts. The results portray 
presidents as exercising circumscribed agency, making decisions on the 
basis of their personal and professional experiences and thus making a 
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difference even under unfavorable conditions. In section VI, I conclude 
that tests of integrated theories in diverse contexts can enhance our 
understanding of the link among leaders, their organizations, and orga-
nizational outcomes. 
I PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
Organizational power refers to the ability to shape organizational 
outcomes despite resistance (Hardy 1996), and there are three positions 
on the power of the college or university president. The majority posi-
tion is that presidential power is constrained by such internal forces as 
campus interest groups, faculty and trustee involvement in governance, 
and faculty collective bargaining, as well as by such external forces as 
public distrust of higher education, reduced government funding of 
postsecondary institutions, and state rules and regulations governing 
these institutions (Birnbaum, 1988; 1989b; Cameron, 1991; Chaffee, 
1984; Cohen & March , 1974; Corson, 1960; 1975; Dennison & 
Gallagher, 1986; Fisher, 1984; Gray, 1998; Hodgkinson, 1971; Jencks 
& Reisman, 1968; Kerr & Gade, 1986; Levin, 1995; McGrath, 1971; 
Mor t imer & McConne l l , 1978; Neumann , 1989; Reisman, 1970; 
Schuster et al., 1994; Shapiro, 1998; Sibley, 1993; Stoke, 1959; 
Vaughan, 1986). For example, Dennison and Gallagher (1986: 195) 
view presidential power in Canadian postsecondary institutions as a 
"fluid and elusive thing," adding that anyone who tries to get a fix on 
power will find it "slipping away like sand in the face of storms and 
driving tides." Some scholars (Birnbaum, 1988; 1989b; Gray, 1998) 
caution against drawing easy conclusions about presidential discretion. 
Birnbaum (1988; 1989b), for one, did not find a link between presiden-
tial succession and institutional cultures, but recognizes that studies of 
other institutional outcomes could find otherwise. Constraint advocates 
(Bi rnbaum, 1988; Cameron , 1991; Dennison & Gallagher, 1986; 
Fisher, 1984; Glenny et al., 1976; Jencks & Reisman, 1968; Kerr & 
Gade, 1986; McGrath, 1971; Neumann, 1989; Schuster et al., 1994; 
Vaughan, 1986) generally agree that presidential autonomy has been 
shrinking over time. For example, Kerr (1963: 32-3) laments that the 
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day of the "Captain of Erudition" has been superseded by the day of 
the "Captain of the Bureaucracy," who sometimes is a "galley slave on 
his own ship." 
Nearly always based on dated evidence and observations, one of the 
two minority positions is that presidents wield substantial power 
(Baldridge et al., 1980; Blau, 1973; Clark, 1973; Demerath et al., 1967; 
Gilley, Fulmer, & Reithlingshoefer, 1986; Gross & Grambsch, 1968; 
1971). For example, Clark (1973) recounts how the founders of Antioch 
College in the 1860s, Reed College in the early 1900s, and Swarthmore 
in the 1860s created "sagas" that enabled them to have an enduring 
impact on their institutions. The other minority position is that presidents 
are constrained in some ways but not in others (Levin, 1992; Neumann 
& Bensimon, 1990). Levin (1992: 42) states that the president "both 
does and does not make a difference" in Canadian colleges. Presidents 
affect a college's culture and reputation but not its policies and programs 
regarding budgeting, educational planning, financial efficiency, and 
related matters. Such structures are thought to be determined by environ-
mental forces beyond the president's control. 
With few exceptions (Birnbaum, 1988; 1989b; Cohen & March, 
1974), research supporting the majority position (and the others) on 
presidential power shares two peculiarities. One is that studies have 
been atheoretical and have not been grounded explicitly in a formal the-
oretical framework (Birnbaum, 1989a). The other is that studies have 
been based on the perceptions of such campus figures as presidents 
(Levin, 1992). I address these theoretical and methodological peculiari-
ties by drawing on strategic leadership theory (Boeker, 1997; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) to explain 
whether the professional backgrounds and experiences of presidents 
affected the adoption of retrenchment (early faculty retirement) plans 
among Ontario universities from 1989-90 to 1997-98. Before turning to 
the theory, I discuss the concept of retrenchment and its history among 
Ontario universities. 
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II RETRENCHMENT 
As defined here, university retrenchment refers to a set of policies an 
institution uses to cut its expenses in the face of environmental and orga-
nizational contingencies (Gates, 1997; Gumport, 1993; Hardy, 1996; 
Neumann, 1995; Rhoades, 1998; Slaughter, 1993). Retrenchment is 
goal-oriented or means-oriented, specific strategies are associated with 
each orientation, and there is tentative evidence on the effectiveness of 
each specific strategy (Chabotar & Honan, 1990). The goal-oriented 
strategy redefines an institution's fundamental goals, occurs through the 
contraction of functions, and evidently is pursued more effectively by 
eliminating unprofitable programs than by decreasing athletic programs 
or community services. The means-oriented strategy entails devising 
improved means by which an institution can manage resources in pursu-
ing its goals. Laying off faculty, decreasing faculty size, increasing bud-
get control, or implementing energy conservation have been designated 
as more effective strategies than laying off administrative staff, decreas-
ing campus maintenance, decreasing salaries, or decreasing student 
recruitment. Reducing faculty size especially is effective because faculty 
salaries and fr inge benefits represent an institution's single largest 
expense, often exceeding fifty percent of the budget. Faculty retrench-
ment or the pursuit of expense cuts through the elimination of faculty 
thus has become a prominent retrenchment strategy (Chabotar & Honan, 
1990; Gates, 1997; Gumport, 1993; Hardy, 1996; Neumann, 1995; 
Rhoades, 1998; Slaughter, 1993). 
Although faculty retrenchment attracted attention across Canada 
during the mid-to-late 1980s, universities displayed a strong preference 
for cutting material (e.g., equipment) rather than more divisive nonmate-
rial (personnel ) expendi tures (Hardy, 1996; Renner, 1986; 1988; 
Skolnik, 1986; 1987; Skolnik & Rowen, 1984). Reflecting the rarity of 
faculty reductions in Ontario, Table 1 (Series 1) shows that the total 
number of full-time (tenure-track and tenured) faculty in the province 
consistently rose during the 1980s, with one trivial exception (1981-82 
to 1982-83). Although universities have continued to cut material expen-
ditures through closings of athletic programs, improvements in energy 
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Table 1 
Full-time faculty at Ontario Universities, 1989-90 to 1997-98 
Y e a r Se r i e s 1 Se r i e s 2 
1 9 7 9 - 8 0 8 ,892 8 , 8 9 2 
1 9 8 0 - 8 1 8 ,983 8 ,983 
1 9 8 1 - 8 2 9 , 0 0 3 9 , 0 0 3 
1 9 8 2 - 8 3 9 , 0 0 3 9 , 0 0 3 
1 9 8 3 - 8 4 9 , 0 4 7 9 , 0 4 7 
1 9 8 4 - 8 5 9 , 0 8 3 9 , 0 8 3 
1 9 8 5 - 8 6 9 , 3 1 4 9 , 3 1 4 
1 9 8 6 - 8 7 9 , 3 9 0 9 , 3 9 0 
1 9 8 7 - 8 8 9 , 5 5 9 9 , 5 5 9 
1 9 8 8 - 8 9 9 ,671 9 ,671 
1 9 8 9 - 9 0 9 , 8 6 3 9 , 8 6 3 
1 9 9 0 - 9 1 9 , 9 9 6 9 , 9 9 6 
1 9 9 1 - 9 2 10 ,028 10 ,541 
1 9 9 2 - 9 3 10 ,140 10 ,661 
1 9 9 3 - 9 4 10 ,043 10 ,598 
1 9 9 4 - 9 5 9 , 7 6 8 10 ,301 
1 9 9 5 - 9 6 9 , 7 0 4 10 ,232 
1 9 9 6 - 9 7 9 , 0 8 6 9 , 5 6 9 
1 9 9 7 - 9 8 9 ,168 9 , 6 6 9 
S o u r c e : S ta t i s t i c s C a n a d a 
Notes: Series 1 : Nipissing University and Ryerson Polytechnic University excluded. 
Series 2: Nipissing University and Ryerson Polytechnic University included. 
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efficiency, and other means ("Cuts hurt," 2000; "Making the transition," 
1992; "University funding," 1991), interest in faculty retrenchment has 
grown as universities have recognized the potential cost savings avail-
able through decreases in compensation and personnel levels (Lorimer, 
1993; "Our aging professoriate," 1989; "Social contract," 1993). The 
strict procedures for faculty layoffs have rendered such events virtually 
impossible (Cameron, 1991), pushing universities to explore such fac-
ulty reduction strategies as attrition through regular retirements, com-
pensation freezes, and early retirement schemes (Lorimer, 1993; 
"Making the transition," 1992; "Social contract," 1993). Since early fac-
ulty retirement schemes can reduce large numbers of faculty quickly, 
with expectations of large savings in the future, they have become the 
retrenchment strategy of choice (Gwyn, 1996; "Making the transition," 
1992; Melchers, 1998; Peters, 1995; "Summary," 1993). 
Table 1 presents two statistical series: Series 1 shows the overall 
number of full-time (tenure-track and tenured) faculty at Ontario univer-
sities, excluding Nipissing University and Ryerson Polytechnic 
University; Series 2 includes data on Nipissing and Ryerson, which were 
established in 1993-94 and 1991-92, respectively. Both series show that 
the number of full-time faculty rose during the early 1990s, peaked dur-
ing 1992-93, and declined during the mid 1990s before stabilizing dur-
ing 1997-98. They also show that the number of faculty in the province 
has declined over 10% since 1992-93. Although these declines could 
have been driven by multiple retrenchment strategies and other factors, 
information secured from the Ontario universities reveals that they have 
occurred overwhelmingly due to early retirements. This situation makes 
sense, since, with one exception, each Ontario university introduced an 
early faculty retirement program in the 1990s, and each one contributed 
significantly to reductions in the university's overall faculty size. This 
means that these programs are linked to declining faculty size at the 
provincial and university levels. 
I focus on early faculty retirement programs not only because they 
have become the dominant means of retrenching but also because 
their introduction has important ramifications. Cuts in material expendi-
tures can leave universities with inadequate facilities and equipment, 
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undermining the education process. But more worrisome are cuts in 
human expenditures achieved through early faculty retirement pro-
grams that generate overall reductions in the number of university fac-
ulty. These reductions require that fewer faculty (perhaps with 
inadequate facilities and equipment) transmit knowledge and skills to 
students, and the adverse effects of this situation purportedly include: 
fewer course offerings, larger and more impersonal classrooms, less 
student-professor contact, overworked faculty with low morale, and 
deteriorating academic quality ("Making large classes work," 1992; 
McGaw, 1993; "Tips and Techniques," 1991). So retrenched universi-
ties may well have difficulties cultivating intellectual mastery among 
students, continuing the search for knowledge, and serving their 
diverse communities. As a result, presidential influence on retrench-
ment decisions becomes a vital issue. 
Since the literature stresses that the adoption of retrenchment 
(early faculty retirement) programs has been driven by uncontrollable 
pressures — especially, voters' criticisms of financial efficiency and 
leadership on campuses and the resulting efforts of government bodies 
to cut university funding (Gumport, 1993; Hardy, 1996; Lorimer, 1993; 
Melchers, 1998; Neumann, 1995; Peters, 1995; Slaughter, 1993; "The 
thorny problem," 1990) — these findings should support the majority 
position on presidential power: Knowledge about presidential charac-
teristics should not help us to distinguish between universities with 
high versus low retrenchment rates because the presence of strong con-
straints has forced presidents with diverse characteristics to retrench. 
Findings revealing that presidents do matter — those with certain pro-
fessional histories sponsor retrenchment and those with different histo-
ries oppose it — would challenge the majority position, portraying 
presidents as agents capable of influencing institutional functioning 
against long odds. Below, I develop a theory on why universities with 
one type of president should be less likely than ones with other types 
to retrench. 
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III A STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP THEORY OF RETRENCHMENT 
Overview 
The term, strategic leadership, refers to top managers who make 
choices that push an organization in one strategic direction or another. 
Accordingly, strategic leadership theory assumes that leaders shape orga-
nizations, focusing on the link between the psychological and social ori-
entations of leaders and organizational outcomes (Bantel & Jackson, 
1989; Boeker, 1997; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). With respect to leaders, attention centers on how chief executive 
officers (CEOs) and top management teams with responsibility for over-
all organizational management differ in terms of psychological and 
observable characteristics. The theory emphasizes such psychological 
attributes as cognitions and values, and personal and professional experi-
ences embodied by such characteristics as tenure and functional back-
ground. With respect to organizational outcomes, attention centers on 
performance and on strategic and structural change. Specific outcomes of 
interest include CEO compensation and dismissal, diversification and 
divestitures, mergers and acquisitions, and profits and sales. 
The logic of bounded rationality underlies the link between leaders' 
orientations and organizational outcomes. Typically overloaded with 
multiple, ambiguous, and even contradictory organizational and environ-
mental stimuli, leaders develop a construed, simplified definition of the 
strategic situation using a three-step information filtering process. The 
first step is to establish a limited field of vision through exposure to a 
subset of all stimuli. The second involves selectively perceiving or notic-
ing a portion of the stimuli in the field of vision. The third step is to 
engage in sense-making, interpreting or attaching meaning to stimuli. 
Leaders filter in different ways because they possess different psycho-
logical and social orientations. As a result, they differ systematically in 
their recognition and interpretation of strategic stimuli, their tolerance of 
ambiguity, their levels of aspiration, cognitive complexity, and political 
acumen, their beliefs about causation, and even their views of their mis-
sion and how urgent it is. So facing identical internal and external con-
tingencies, leaders with different orientations should develop different 
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definitions of the strategic situations and thus prefer different outcomes. 
And as these preferences are pursued, an organization becomes a reflec-
tion of its leaders. 
Like the literature on presidential powers, strategic leadership theory 
posits that courses of action generally will be determined by environmen-
tal pressures, and not by leaders, when substantial constraints are present. 
But this position leaves room for constrained leaders to perceive, to cre-
ate, and to pursue alternative actions, relying on their creativity and 
insight, persistence, political acumen, sheer will, and other personal qual-
ities and experiences. This theory also suggests that leaders can make a 
difference by endorsing or thwarting change, and that the organizational 
effects of change can be functional or dysfunctional. I draw on the theory 
in considering whether knowledge about the divergent orientations of 
constrained presidents helps us to differentiate between retrenched and 
nonretrenched universities. If it does, then presidents matter in the sense 
that those with certain orientations can resist adopting a plan (retrench-
ment) with potential economic functions and academic dysfunctions, 
when facing strong pressures to do otherwise. I now identify these orien-
tations by formulating the specific hypotheses to be tested. 
Specific Hypotheses 
There is considerable research on whether three background charac-
teristics reflective of leaders' observable experiences — tenure, func-
tional background, and formal education — influence outcomes in the 
corporate sector (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Boeker, 1997; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). Two key weaknesses in this research are the narrow-
ness of the leader experiences and populations that have been studied 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Recognizing the potential theoretical 
and empirical payoffs of supplementing these studies with ones that 
investigate different leader experiences in different industrial sectors, I 
consider whether six background characteristics of university presidents 
— tenure, age, academic background, successor type, corporate board 
experience, and gender — explain the adoption of retrenchment (early 
faculty retirement) packages among Ontario universities from 1989-90 
to 1997-98. 
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Leaders with long tenures should be reluctant to sanction change. 
There are four main reasons for this. First, they should possess well-
established mental models of priorities, options, and causal relations, 
prompting them to express confidence in existing strategic, structural, and 
human arrangements in their organizations. Second, the creation of 
refined information routines and the cultivation of trusted sources of 
information familiar with leaders' preferences should encourage these 
leaders to stay the course. Third, long-tenured leaders' relative mastery of 
the job should foster disinterest in organizational experimentation. 
Fourth, these leaders have a stake in the status quo and possess the power 
to preserve it (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Boeker, 1997; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). Accordingly, there should be a negative relationship 
between the length of presidential tenure and university retrenchment 
rates: As presidential tenure increases, rates of adoption of early faculty 
retirement plans should decrease. But since presidential tenure and age 
often are intercorrelated (Bantel & Jackson 1989), this hypothesis can be 
tested rigorously only if the causal effects of these presidential demo-
graphics are disentangled. Therefore, I also examine presidential age, 
hypothesizing that older presidents' confidence in the status quo will lead 
them to retrench at lower rates than their younger counterparts (on this 
general logic, see Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
Leaders' functional backgrounds should affect how organizational 
problems and solutions are viewed because leaders increasingly become 
socialized with the style of thinking and acting appropriate for a func-
tional area as they spend time and achieve successes in that area. So 
leaders in different functions should have different experiences, cogni-
tive models, and values, prompting them to perceive and to solve prob-
lems differently (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996; Fligstein, 1990; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Are the academic 
backgrounds of university presidents a cause of retrenchment? Hardy 
(1996) discusses the rise of a managerial ethos advocating a business or 
an economic approach to university administration, which encourages 
administrators to enhance efficiency through retrenchment and through 
other means — for example, program evaluation and strategic planning 
— often linked to retrenchment. Presidents with business or economics 
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expertise should be more likely than others to embrace managerialism. 
Indeed, they especially should have been exposed to the principles of 
rat ional e f f ic ien t management during their universi ty careers. 
Accordingly, these presidents should view retrenchment as a viable solu-
tion to the problems facing their institutions. Fewer managerialists 
should be found among presidents with different expertise, who thus 
should be less apt to see retrenchment as a solution to existing problems. 
I hypothesize that presidents lacking business or economics backgrounds 
should implement faculty retrenchment (early retirement) plans at lower 
rates than those with these backgrounds. 
Most presidential candidates move from university to university, ris-
ing up the job ladder. Consequently, outside leadership succession is far 
more common than inside succession in higher education (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). Inside and outside successors should have different dis-
positions and should face different constraints and opportunities. Insiders 
tend to be committed to the status quo and thus tend to be reticent to pur-
sue new courses of action. They also tend to be constrained interperson-
ally and socially due to their long-standing ties to internal personnel, 
inhibiting them from making personnel changes. Compared to their coun-
terparts, outsiders have low attachments to the existing regime and thus 
are more open to change. They also are unencumbered interpersonally 
and socially due to their weak ties to organizational personnel, freeing 
them to make changes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Applying this information to the context of university 
retrenchment, I expect that inside presidential successors will adopt early 
faculty retirement schemes at lower rates than outside successors. 
Social change can occur as some members of a social network dissem-
inate information about a practice's ability to solve a problem to others in 
the network through direct interactions. This social activity allows the oth-
ers to learn about the practice, to form beliefs about its efficacy and gen-
eral applicability, and then to adopt it. Focusing on corporate boards of 
directors, the idea is that exposure to an organizational practice through 
board membership leads directors to learn about it, to define it as norma-
tively appropriate, and finally to adopt it in their organizations (Davis 
1991; Haunschild 1993). I argue that, since retrenchment (including early 
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retirement) programs have been common among Canadian firms over the 
pas t decade (see the special 1998 issue of Canadian Journal of 
Administrative Sciences), university presidents sitting on corporate boards 
have possessed ample information on the potential ability of retrenchment 
to solve resource (financial) problems. Indeed, corporate leaders not only 
have supplied presidents with such information, but also have exhorted 
them to save costs through retrenchment (Useem, 1993). In contrast, lack-
ing the relevant face-to-face interactions, information exchanges, and cog-
nitive transformations experienced by presidents with seats on corporate 
boards, those without seats should be less likely to perceive retrenchment 
as a viable problem-solving strategy. If so, then presidential nonmember-
ship on corporate boards and retrenchment will vary negatively: Presidents 
without board membership will adopt early faculty retirement programs at 
lower rates than those with board membership. 
There is scant theory and research on the relationship between orga-
nizational leaders' gender and organizational change because nearly all 
of these leaders are men (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). This reality 
raises the question: How similar are male and female leaders? Studies of 
corporate managers in general make two relevant comparisons. The one 
involving women managers and nonmanagers shows that the managers 
are more achieving, more production-oriented, and more apt to view 
themselves as having managerial and male characteristics. The other 
comparison reveals that women and men managers perceive themselves 
as possessing similar traits and styles (Billing & Alvesson, 1994; 
Harriman, 1996; Wacjman, 1998). Although these studies suggest that 
female and male managers are similar, others report that women must 
stand out from men in order to secure and to retain high-level posts (Kay 
& Hagan, 1998). Their distinctiveness can be demonstrated by having a 
history of being the first in a new position, by spurring organizational 
changes, by taking major risks and succeeding, and by other means 
(Kanter, 1977; Kay & Hagan, 1998). Since female presidents occupy a 
nontraditional (leadership) position, and since they thus have good rea-
son to feel pressed to initiate changes and to take risks, their experiences 
and cognitive models may well lead them to be more likely retrenchers 
than their male counterparts. Accordingly, I hypothesize that the gender 
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of university presidents (male) and retrenchment will vary negatively: 
Male presidents will adopt early faculty retirement plans at lower rates 
than female presidents. 
Controls 
In order to conclude that university presidents matter, I should show 
that their attributes affect retrenchment above and beyond the influence 
of other relevant factors. Therefore I analyze seven statistical controls, 
two of which are central to resource dependence theory (Benson, 1975; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Ontario universities depend primarily on the 
provincial government for their operating expenses (Council of Ontario 
Universities, 1989-1998), giving the government the power to push them 
to cut expenses substantially (Ford, 1994; "Making the transition," 
1992). Since more than 80% of university expenditures are on salaries 
and benefits (Hardy, 1996), universities have responded to the govern-
ment by cutting faculty expenditures, especially through early faculty 
retirements ("Making the transition," 1992; Peters, 1995). Recognizing 
that financial dependence on the government varies across universities, I 
expect that more dependent universities should retrench at higher rates 
than less dependent ones. The government also could use a "manipula-
tive" strategy (Benson, 1975) — cuts in operating grants — to speed the 
spread of early faculty retirement packages. In fact, the universities 
experienced cuts in real operating grants per student during the 1990s 
("COU calls," 1991; Gwyn, 1996; "Ontario goes ahead," 1997; Russell, 
1998) and many link them to faculty retrenchment (Gwyn, 1996), sug-
gesting that universities with large cuts should retrench at higher rates 
than those with smaller cuts. 
Tests of the diametric forces model of university restructuring show 
that financial stress causes universities to add business programs, and 
that the effects of these additions include increased student enrollments 
and operating margins (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993). Since this situation sug-
gests that business schools are valuable revenue generators for universi-
ties, I hypothesize that institutions with business schools should adopt 
early faculty retirement plans at lower rates than institutions lacking 
them. The diametric forces model recognizes that older universities may 
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change easily. First, they should have established ties with such powerful 
outsiders as government officials who provide them with resources that 
stimulate change (e.g., information revealing the government's serious 
interest in cost-cutting). Second, they should possess considerable man-
agerial experience and extensive functional structures, which encourage 
change. University age may influence retrenchment, in particular, 
because it serves as a proxy for other influences. For one thing, older 
universities may be more research-oriented than younger ones, making 
them less sensitive to the possible negative effects of retrenchment on 
teaching and faculty-student relationships. For another, older institutions 
may have a larger percentage of older and thus costlier faculty than 
younger institutions, giving them greater potential financial savings from 
the adoption of retrenchment plans. This material indicates that age 
dependence in the adoption of retrenchment plans should be positive. 
For methodological reasons, it is important to analyze an organiza-
tion's complete history of change by taking into account repetitive 
momentum (Miller & Frieson, 1980). The idea is that the social legiti-
macy of a particular change rises each time an organization makes the 
change, and that the gains in legitimacy increase the likelihood that it 
will be repeated in the future. Some of Ontario's universities adopted 
cost (faculty) reduction programs before the 1990s, under social condi-
tions distinctly different from the conditions under which these adop-
tions occurred. So it would be unwise to examine the adoptions of the 
1980s and 1990s using a single empirical model (Palmer et al. 1995). 
Instead, I focus on the critical decade of the 1990s, when retrenchment 
programs proliferated. However, since prior adoptions of these programs 
may affect the adoptions of interest, I evaluate the hypothesis that adop-
tion rates will be higher among universities with prior adoptions than 
among ones without them. Although this hypothesis implies that organi-
zations that change are unlikely to stop changing, organizations do pass 
from periods of change into periods of relative stability. To reconcile this 
fact with the above hypothesis, I reason that organizations seek solutions 
to problems by referring to their most recently adopted routines 
(changes). As the time since a routine's adoption increases, it is less 
likely that an organization will make additional changes in it (Amburgey, 
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Kelly, & Barnett, 1993). According to this dynamic momentum logic, a 
university that initiated a change in the distant past is less likely than one 
that recently initiated it to undertake modifications. Therefore, retrench-
ment rates should decrease with the elapsed time since the last (pre-
observation period) adoption of this type occurred. 
Finally, strategic leadership researchers (Boeker, 1997) often analyze 
time dependence in order to determine whether the probability that an 
organization will undergo change varies over time. Specifications for 
time dependence are advantageous because they ensure that unspecified, 
time-specific factors will be held constant (Allison, 1985). Although 
time dependence often is either positive or negative, it can assume more 
complicated forms (Allison, 1985; Yamaguchi, 1991). But since prelimi-
nary modeling revealed that time dependence in the focal dependent 
variable is positive (i.e., retrenchment rates increase with the passage of 
time) I expect time-dependence effects to be positive. 
IV METHODS 
Population and Time Frame 
I examine early faculty retirement programs among the population 
of universities in Ontario (N = 17), excluding the Royal Military College 
of Canada (RMC).1 Focusing on the period from 1989-90 to 1997-98 
does not create "censoring" problems (Allison, 1985; Yamaguchi, 1991). 
Organizations are right-censored when they have not retrenched by 
1997-98. But this occurrence poses no problems, since event-history 
methods handles it effectively. The main problem with left-censoring 
occurs when organizations disappear through such means as death 
before the observation period begins. In these cases, nothing is known 
about the life histories of organizations that are relevant to the event 
under study. Such left-censoring is absent in this study, since no univer-
sities disappeared before the observation period begins. 
Measurement 
Faculty Retrenchment. An early retirement program allows faculty 
members to leave their current employer before they become eligible for 
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normal retirement. The dependent variable specifies the academic year 
during which each of the universities formally decided to adopt such a 
program.2 To obtain information on the dependent variable, I contacted 
officials in each university's Human Relations or Personnel Office. 
These officials also offered supplementary details on the retrenchments, 
such as the number of early faculty retirees and the content of the early 
retirement agreements, and some provided formal documentation on the 
retrenchments . I verif ied the information supplied by the officials 
through contacts with faculty associations at the universities and/or 
through examination of published articles on the retrenchments. 
Independent Variables. Beginning with the leadership variables, 
academic background is a dummy variable scored as 1 for presidents 
lacking business or economics backgrounds and as 0 otherwise. Age and 
tenure refer to the age of the president and to the number of years s/he 
has held office, respectively. Corporate board experience, gender, and 
successor type are dummies coded as 1 for presidents lacking seats on 
corporate boards and as 0 for those with seats, as 1 for male presidents 
and as 0 for women presidents, and as 1 for inside presidential appoint-
ments and as 0 for outside appointments, respectively. All of these data 
come from Who's Who in Canada and from private communications 
with the presidents. Turning to the controls, university dependence is the 
percentage of each university's annual expendable revenues secured 
through government grants, the data for which can be found in the 
Council of Ontario Universities' (COU's) Financial Report of Ontario 
Universities: Volume 1 - Universities. Net revenue decline is the rate of 
decrease in each university's real net revenues (total revenues minus 
expendi tures) f rom 1989-90 to 1997-98. Since shifts (particularly 
declines) in university finances are driven almost exclusively by shifts in 
government funding, this variable provides information on shifts in gov-
ernment funding of universities over time. I collected the data from the 
C O U ' s Financial Report of Ontario Universities : Volume 1 -
Universities. Business school is a dummy scored as 1 for universities 
with business schools and as 0 otherwise. The data come from the Guide 
to Business Schools (1998). University age is the total number of years 
since the establishment of each university. I logged this variable in order 
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to normalize its distribution and obtained the data from Cameron (1991). 
I scored repetitive momentum as unity when a university implemented a 
retrenchment plan prior to the observation period (from 1989-90 to 
1997-98) and as zero otherwise. With respect to dynamic momentum, I 
constructed a duration "clock" to record the number of years that elapsed 
since the adoption of an early faculty retirement plan (Amburgey, Kelly, 
& Barnett, 1993). The clock's value is 0 until an adoption occurs. If an 
adoption occurs before 1989-90, then the clock records the elapsed time 
since this adoption up to the time of adoption in the observation period. 
So for the right-censored university that never had an adoption, the value 
of the clock is 0 throughout the observation period. For universities with 
adoptions during the observation period only, the value of the clock is 0 
until these adoptions occur. For universities with adoptions before and 
during the observation period, the value of the clock is 0 until the pre-
observation period adoption occurs; the clock then records the passage 
of time until the observation period adoption occurs. No university com-
bined a pre-observation period adoption with non-adoption during the 
observation period. Time dependence is a measure of calendar time. 
Model 
I modeled the program adoptions using discrete-time event history 
models (Allison, 1985; Yamaguchi, 1991)3 and began by creating a 
record for each academic year that each university was at risk of 
retrenching. For each university, I coded the dependent variable as 0 in 
years in which the event did not occur and as 1 in the year in which it 
finally did. I coded this variable as 0 for each relevant year when a uni-
versity never experienced the event; these cases are said to be "cen-
sored ." I also ass igned values of independent var iables for each 
university in each relevant year before pooling the completed records for 
statistical analysis. I began with the following logistic regression model: 
P(t)= a + bkxk + bkxk(t) (1) 
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where: P(t) is the hazard or transition rate, the probability of retrenching 
at time t for universities at risk of undergoing retrenchment; a is the 
intercept; x k is a vector of time-invariant independent variables (e.g., 
repetitive momentum); and xk(t) is a vector of time-varying independent 
variables (e.g., university age). Two of these variables — university 
dependence and net revenue decline — are lagged to guard against 
simultaneity problems. The dependent variable P(t) is a linear function 
of the independent variables, whose coefficients, bk and bk(t), are esti-
mated using the method of maximum likelihood. These coefficients are 
similar to unstandardized regression coefficients in that they depend on 
the metric of each independent variable: The coefficients bk and bk(t) 
specify the change in the logit (log-odds) for each one-unit increase in xk 
and xk(t), respectively. To avoid computational and interpretative prob-
lems, I reformulated equation (1) by calculating the logit transformation 
of P(t) and used this model in the empirical analyses: 
Log P(t)/1 -P(t)= a + b kx k + bkxv(t) (2) 
V CAUSES OF RETRENCHMENT 
Baseline Model 
The annual rates of adoption of early faculty retirement packages are 
plotted in Figure 1, raising the question: Why do these rates vary over 
time? I answer this question by beginning with a brief review of a base-
line model containing statistical controls that explain 50% of the varia-
tion in the adoption rates (see Table 2).4 These rates are related positively 
to five of the controls —- net revenue decline, university dependence, 
university age, dynamic momentum, and time dependence — and are 
related negatively to two of them — presence of a business school and 
repetitive momentum. As expected, retrenchers suffer large government-
driven reductions in net revenues, secure a large percentage of their 
operating revenues from the provincial government, are older institu-
tions, and do not possess business schools. Also, the rate of adoption of 
early faculty retirement plans increases with the passage of time. 
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Figure 1 
Annual faculty retrenchment rates among Ontario universities, 
1989-1997 
Year 
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Table 2 
Adoption of early faculty retirement plans among Ontario 
universities, 1989-90 to 1997-98 
M o d e l 1 2 
Presidential Characteristics: 
T e n u r e - . 1 1 7 
( . 2 8 2 ) 
A g e . 254 
( . 2 1 0 ) 
A c a d e m i c B a c k g r o u n d 
( 1 = n o n - b u s i n e s s / n o n - e c o n o m i c s ) 
- 4 . 2 0 b 
(2 .19 ) 
S u c c e s s o r T y p e ( l = i n s i d e r ) 3 . 5 7 a 
(2 .90 ) 
C o r p o r a t e B o a r d E x p e r i e n c e ( l = n o ) 9 .41 c 
(4 .05 ) 
G e n d e r ( l = m a l e ) - 10 .94 b 
(5 .38 ) 
Controls: 
U n i v e r s i t y D e p e n d e n c e . 184 b 
( . 093 ) 
. 7 5 1 c 
( . 304 ) 
N e t R e v e n u e D e c l i n e 3 . 2 0 c 
0 . 2 1 ) 
9 . 5 0 c 
(3 .85 ) 
B u s i n e s s S c h o o l ( l = y e s ) 1 .94 a 
(1 .49 ) 
- 7 . 3 9 b 
(4 .55 ) 
U n i v e r s i t y A g e 1.87 c 
( . 8 3 2 ) 
4 . 7 7 b 
(2 .39 ) 
R e p e t i t i v e M o m e n t u m - 8 . 0 3 c 
(2 .96 ) 
- 2 1 . 2 3 c 
(8 .86) 
D y n a m i c M o m e n t u m .641 c 
( . 255 ) 
2 . 0 7 c 
( . 8 5 3 ) 
T i m e D e p e n d e n c e .539 b 
( . 260 ) 
2 . 7 0 c 
(1 .15 ) 
A d j u s t e d R 2 
- 2 L o g L i k e l i h o o d 
. 504 
4 8 . 6 4 
.767 
2 6 . 6 1 
a p < .10 b p < . 0 5 c p < .01 (one-tailed tests) 
Notes: University-years = 77; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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A university that retrenched before the observation period should 
have done so again during it, having become familiar with this change 
(repetitive momentum). But as the time since the university's initial 
retrenchment passed, the change should have become less relevant to its 
search for solutions to new problems; as a result, modifications in the 
change increasingly should have declined (dynamic momentum). So 
why do the results indicate that universities with retrenchment experi-
ence have lower retrenchment rates than others, and that retrenchment 
rates increase as the time since the initial retrenchment increases? There 
should be no reason to modify an initial change as long as it solves a 
problem adequately; indeed, modifications would be unnecessary and 
could even be counterproductive. Retrenchment rates thus are lower 
among universities with retrenchment histories than among others 
because the former universities matched a solution — retrenchment — 
with a set of problems — government pressure to economize, for exam-
ple — before the onset of the observation period. And it is only when 
social conditions evolve over time that the nature and/or severity of an 
organizational problem should change, motivating an organization to 
search for a new solution to the current problem. Hence, the political 
economy in which Ontario universities operated began to change in the 
early 1990s, prompting universities with old retrenchment policies ill-
suited for current conditions to introduce new ones. 
Leadership Model 
To determine whether presidential backgrounds contribute toward 
explaining the adoption rates, above and beyond the explanation offered 
by the controls, I used the Likelihood-Ratio Chi-Square statistic to test 
the null hypothesis that adding the background factors (see model 2 in 
Table 2) to model 1 has no effect on the model's fit (Allison, 1984).5 
Since this statistic reveals that the fit improves when these factors are 
taken into account (p < .01), I reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that presidents matter in the analysis of retrenchment (early faculty 
retirement) plans among Ontario universities from 1989-90 to 1997-98. 
Indeed, the addition of the background factors boosts the variation 
explained by about 27%, bringing the overall variation explained to 
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nearly 77%. While the results for the controls are unchanged in model 2, 
four of the six background factors are significant statistically: The signs 
attached to the coefficients for corporate board experience, academic 
background, and presidential gender are negative and the sign attached 
to the coefficient for successor type is positive (this factor is marginally 
significant at p = .10). Before discussing these results, I should note that 
my conclusion that university presidents influence retrenchment is not 
based on direct observation of presidential behavior. Instead, it is based 
on the empirical evidence (statistics) linking presidential backgrounds 
and retrenchment, and on the theoretical logic underlying these links. 
As an industrial ethos has penetrated higher education in Canada, 
administrators have introduced managerial techniques into their univer-
sities. Managerialism has four key features. First is strategic planning, a 
set of analytical techniques used to evaluate university strengths and 
weaknesses in the face of environmental constraints and opportunities, 
with the evaluation followed by the formulation and implementation of a 
rational administrative plan. Second is decisive action, whereby weak 
areas of a university are eliminated and strong areas receive extra 
resources. Third is the central role played by the president in strategic 
decision-making. Fourth is the assumption that rational analysis pro-
duces "objective" information that unambiguously discloses optimal 
strategies. Insofar as it advocates systematic program evaluation, objec-
tive resource allocation, and directive leadership to improve perfor-
mance, managerialism has been associated with retrenchment (Hardy, 
1996). The findings on presidential board experience and academic 
backgrounds add insight into the association between managerialism and 
retrenchment, suggesting that presidents with relatively weak managerial 
orientations — those without corporate board experience, such as 
Nipissing's David Marshall, or those without academic experience in 
business or economics, such as York's Harry Arthurs — gain less expo-
sure to managerial techniques and ideology than presidents with stronger 
managerial orientations — those possessing corporate board experience, 
such as Terrence White (a director of Labatt's Brewery and author of a 
book on directors in Canadian corporations) who led Brock and Calgary, 
or those possessing academic backgrounds in business or economics, 
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such as Wilfrid Laurier's John Weir. And as a result, the former adopt 
early faculty retirement schemes at lower rates than the latter. 
Retrenchment rates are lower among male than among female presi-
dents, inviting further discussion of the retrenching tendencies of the lat-
ter. Some evidence indicates that women must demonstrate special 
talents — for example, by spearheading change or by taking risks — in 
order to occupy leadership positions (Kanter, 1977; Kay & Hagan, 
1998). This finding adds to this evidence, the special talents being 
reflected in the tendency of female presidents to preside over university 
adoptions of early faculty retirement programs. As an illustration of this 
tendency, York introduced a Special Early Retirement Program (SERP) 
to faculty while Susan Mann was the university's president in the early-
to-mid 1990s. The program initially was offered to about 350 faculty 
members, 40 of whom enrolled in it. The program later was offered to 
about 405 faculty members, 20 of whom accepted the offer. The objec-
tive was to allow eligible faculty members to retire early while allowing 
the university to restructure its operations and to reduce permanently its 
base budget during the mid-to-later 1990s. Recognizing the political and 
financial realities facing all Ontario universities, Mann stated: "Across 
the system, I think you will have fewer professors, larger classes and a 
lot more experimentation with technology" (Duffy, 1995). 
Although organizational change generally occurs when a leader has 
been recruited from outside an organization (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996), these findings show that it tends to occur when a leader has been 
promoted from within an organization. This situation can be explained by 
recognizing that, while the literature overwhelmingly addresses leader-
ship succession in corporations with many thousands of employees 
(Birnbaum, 1989a; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Keast, 1996), this 
study examines it in universities with hundreds of employees (faculty 
members). The demographic, structural, and cultural differences between 
these two contexts suggest that inside university successors should have 
greater opportunities than their corporate counterparts to cultivate strong 
professional and personal ties with many members of their organizations. 
Indeed, before taking office, inside university successors are able to serve 
on a wide range of departmental, interdepartmental, and university-wide 
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committees, enabling them to develop rich, extensive social networks. 
These findings indicate that such inside university successors as Ottawa's 
Marcel Hamelin and Windsor's Ronald Ianni take advantage of the bonds 
of trust and confidence they have nurtured with their brethren in endors-
ing early retirement plans aimed at reducing faculty employment levels. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Since the wealth of studies stating that universities are not molded 
by their presidents (Birnbaum, 1989b; Cohen & March, 1974; Dennison 
& Gallagher, 1986; Sibley, 1993) typically are atheoretical (Birnbaum, 
1989a) and perceptual (Levin, 1992) in nature, additional appraisals of 
presidential power are required before definitive conclusions on this 
issue can be drawn. To this end, I have used strategic leadership theory 
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Boeker, 1997; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984) to determine whether observable experi-
ences of presidents influenced the adoption of retrenchment (early fac-
ulty retirement) schemes among Ontario universities from 1989-90 to 
1997-98. These adoptions have swept across these universities during 
the past decade (Gwyn, 1996; "Making the transition," 1992; Melchers, 
1998; Peters, 1995; "Summary," 1993) and evidence indicates that they 
have affected academic conditions adversely ("Making large classes 
work," 1992; McGaw, 1993; "Tips and techniques." 1991). The adop-
tions thus are important, representing a key structural change among 
higher educational institutions that combines potential financial benefits 
and educational costs. 
The results show that who presidents are and what they do shape 
institutional change. Those who lack seats on corporate boards, who have 
non-business or non-economics backgrounds, who are male, and who are 
external hires introduce early faculty retirement plans at lower rates than 
those who serve on corporate boards, who have business or economics 
backgrounds, who are female, and who are internal hires. These results 
are impressive because the literature attributes the adoption of these plans 
to intractable pressures, especially public ambivalence about university 
operat ions and consequent government cuts in universi ty funding 
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(Gumport, 1993; Lorimer, 1993; Melchers, 1998; Neumann, 1995; Peters, 
1995; Slaughter, 1993; "The thorny problem," 1995). Therefore, I should 
have discovered that the adoptions cannot be traced to presidents, but this 
did not happen. The results portray presidents neither as impotent reactors 
to hostile environments nor as heroic masters of their environments, but 
as individuals with personal and professional experiences affecting how 
they handle information and make decisions. Consequently, some can 
have a greater likelihood of making a specific change than others. This 
consequence means that presidents can be seen as exercising circum-
scribed agency, struggling to make a difference and succeeding even 
under inhospitable circumstances. 
This research also advances strategic leadership theory, which has 
focused on the link between three characteristics reflective of leaders' 
observable experiences — tenure, functional background, and formal 
education — and outcomes among corporations. Strategic leadership 
theorists (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) acknowledge the need to 
broaden the set of leader experiences and populations under investiga-
tion and, in response, I have combined conventional and unconventional 
measures of leader experiences in examining a specific outcome 
(retrenchment) among universities. Of course, extant theoretical contri-
butions of this research should not go unnoticed. For example, interest in 
the link between social structure and economic action has generated a 
literature showing that embeddedness in social networks affects corpo-
rate outcomes (Uzzi, 1996). Much of this literature reveals the impact 
that embeddedness in intercorporate networks, especially a corporate 
actor's membership on corporate boards of directors, has on corporate 
change. The assumption is that directors gather information on the kind 
of practices other directors use to solve a problem. The information 
shapes the cognitive map and values of a director lacking a preferred 
practice, motivating the director to adopt it in her/his corporation (Davis, 
1991; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer at al., 1995). This research contributes 
to this literature by demonstrating that embeddedness in interindustry 
networks — a university president's membership on a corporate board 
— influences retrenchment. The evidence suggests that presidents with 
board experience learn about this practice or, more generally, about the 
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value of efficient personnel policies from corporate directors and apply 
what they have learned by retrenching their universities. In contrast, 
those lacking board experience have less exposure to retrenchment ide-
ology and procedures, leading them to avoid retrenchment. Since net-
work processes may underlie the relationship between other leader 
attributes — for example, successor type (insider/outsider) — and 
retrenchment, we need to devote additional theoretical and empirical 
attention to structural embeddedness in future retrenchment research. 
This sort of theoretical cross-fertilization should facilitate our search for 
an adequate understanding of retrenchment and, more generally, of the 
interrelationships among leaders, their organizations, and organizational 
outcomes. 
Notes 
1 T h e R M C s p e c i a l i z e s in e d u c a t i n g a n d t r a in ing s tuden t s f o r ca ree r s as 
c o m m i s s i o n e d o f f i c e r s in t he C a n a d i a n F o r c e s a n d o f f e r s a l imi t ed n u m b e r o f 
a c a d e m i c p r o g r a m s ( D i r e c t o r y o f C a n a d i a n Un ive r s i t i e s ) . A l s o , its o p e r a t i o n is 
a f f e c t e d b y f a c t o r s t ha t a re i r r e l evan t to the o t h e r un ive r s i t i e s . S i n c e t he R M C is 
u n i q u e , in t e r m s o f i ts a c a d e m i c o r i e n t a t i o n a n d in t e r m s o f t h e f a c t o r s t ha t 
m i g h t i n d u c e it t o r e t r e n c h , it m a k e s s e n s e to o m i t the ins t i tu t ion f r o m the fo r -
m a l m o d e l s . 
2 A l t h o u g h u n i v e r s i t i e s r e p e a t e d l y c o u l d h a v e a d o p t e d ea r ly f a c u l t y re t i re -
m e n t p r o g r a m s f r o m 1 9 8 9 - 9 0 t o 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 , I i n v e s t i g a t e t he i r ini t ia l a d o p t i o n s 
d u r i n g t h e s e y e a r s f o r t h r ee r e a s o n s . O n e is t ha t s u b s e q u e n t a d o p t i o n s h a v e b e e n 
u n c o m m o n a n d t y p i c a l l y h a v e i n v o l v e d e x t e n s i o n s o f ini t ia l p r o g r a m s or m i n o r 
p r o g r a m c h a n g e s . A n o t h e r is t ha t in i t ia l a d o p t i o n s s h o u l d enta i l d e c i s i o n - m a k -
ing t h a t c a r r i e s g r e a t e r r i sk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y t h a n tha t i n v o l v e d in s u b s e q u e n t 
a d o p t i o n s , s u g g e s t i n g tha t t he c a u s e s o f ini t ia l a n d s u b s e q u e n t a d o p t i o n s m a y 
v a r y a n d t h u s tha t t h e s e e v e n t s s h o u l d b e m o d e l e d sepa ra t e ly . T h e th i rd r e a s o n 
f o r i n v e s t i g a t i n g w h y u n i v e r s i t i e s a d o p t ea r ly f a c u l t y r e t i r e m e n t p r o g r a m s f o r 
t he f i r s t t i m e is t ha t e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f r e p e a t e d a d o p t i o n s r e q u i r e s a s s u m p -
t i ons (e .g . , a m o d u l a t e d r e n e w a l p r o c e s s ) tha t are v io l a t ed eas i ly (on o the r s ta t is -
t ica l i s sues , s e e A l l i s o n , 1984; Y a m a g u c h i , 1991) . 
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^ T h e u s e o f th i s d i s c r e t e - t i m e e v e n t h i s to ry m o d e l is a p p r o p r i a t e in th i s 
c o n t e x t , f o r t w o k e y r e a s o n s . F i rs t , th is m o d e l s h o u l d b e u s e d w h e n v a r i a b l e s 
a re m e a s u r e d in r e l a t ive ly l a rge un i t s of t i m e , s u c h as yea r s , a n d b o t h t he i nde -
p e n d e n t a n d d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s in th is s t u d y a re m e a s u r e d in yea r s . S e c o n d , 
o c c a s i o n a l l y r e t r e n c h m e n t s o c c u r f o r a subs tan t i a l n u m b e r o f un ive r s i t i e s at the 
s a m e t i m e a n d , u n l i k e " c o n t i n u o u s - t i m e " e v e n t h i s t o r y m o d e l s , d i s c r e t e - t i m e 
m o d e l s r e a d i l y h a n d l e th i s s i tua t ion . P lus , d i s c r e t e - t i m e m o d e l s nea r ly a l w a y s 
g e n e r a t e findings t h a t c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e t h o s e g e n e r a t e d b y c o n t i n u o u s - t i m e 
m o d e l s (on t h e s e i s sues , s e e A l l i s o n , 1985; Y a m a g u c h i , 1991) . 
4 L e t m e m a k e t h r e e p o i n t s a b o u t t he m o d e l in T a b l e 2. F i rs t , a s is s t a n d a r d 
p r a c t i c e ( B l a l o c k , 1979; S t e f f e n s m e i e r & D e m u t h , 2 0 0 0 ) , I u s e tes ts o f s ta t is t i -
cal i n f e r e n c e e v e n t h o u g h I a m inves t i ga t i ng a p o p u l a t i o n (all O n t a r i o un ive r s i -
t i e s ) r a t h e r t h a n a s a m p l e . T h e s e t e s t s t h u s do no t a p p l y in t he c o n v e n t i o n a l 
s e n s e o f a s s e s s i n g e r ro r in m a k i n g i n f e r e n c e s to the p o p u l a t i o n f r o m w h i c h t he 
s a m p l e w a s d r a w n . I n s t e a d , t hey a re u s e d to m a k e i n f e r e n c e s a b o u t t he c a u s a l 
p r o c e s s e s g e n e r a t i n g t he p o p u l a t i o n da ta , r e f l e c t i n g a n i n t e r e s t in t h e o r e t i c a l 
e x p l a n a t i o n o r in w h y a n y g i v e n r e l a t i o n s h i p h a s b e e n r e p o r t e d . In th i s c o n t e x t , 
a s t a t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p r e f l e c t s d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n s u b p o p u l a -
t i ons — t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f r e t r e n c h m e n t a m o n g o ld v e r s u s y o u n g e r un ive r s i t i e s , 
f o r e x a m p l e — so s u b s t a n t i a l tha t the r e l a t i o n s h i p is v i e w e d as o c c u r r i n g n o t 
d u e to c h a n c e b u t d u e to c a u s a l p r o c e s s e s d e s c r i b e d t h r o u g h theore t i ca l l og ic 
( B l a l o c k , 1979) . S e c o n d , in th i s d i s c r e t e - t i m e e v e n t h i s to ry ana lys i s , the n u m b e r 
o f c a s e s is s p e c i f i e d in t e r m s of u n i v e r s i t y - y e a r s . T h e n u m b e r o f y e a r s e a c h un i -
ve r s i t y r e m a i n s in t he r isk set is c a l c u l a t e d a n d t h e s e f i g u r e s t h e n a re s u m m e d 
u p ( A l l i s o n , 1985 ; Y a m a g u c h i , 1991) . T h e r e l a t ive ly sma l l n u m b e r o f c a s e s in 
th i s s t u d y (N = 77 ) m e a n s tha t t he s t a n d a r d e r ro r s l ike ly a re in f l a t ed , a r t i f i c ia l ly 
i n c r e a s i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e leve ls . C o n s e q u e n t l y , I f o l l o w the c o n v e n t i o n a l p r ac t i c e 
o f u s i n g p < .10 as t h e b a s e l i n e s i g n i f i c a n c e l eve l ( B r a d s h a w , 1987; D e v i n e , 
1 9 8 3 ) . T h i r d , s u p p l e m e n t a r y d i a g n o s t i c s i n d i c a t e t h a t m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y ( t h e 
l a r g e s t V a r i a n c e I n f l a t i o n F a c t o r or V I F is 7 .6 , w e l l b e l o w the p r o b l e m a t i c a l 
v a l u e o f 10, a n d t h e l a rges t C o n d i t i o n I n d e x is 6 .6 , n o w h e r e n e a r t he p r o b l e m a t -
ical v a l u e o f 20 ) p o s e s n o p r o b l e m s in t h e s e a n a l y s e s . 
^ T h e l e a d e r s h i p v a r i a b l e s a l so do n o t p o s s e s s m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y p r o b l e m s 
( t he l a rges t V I F is 3 .6 a n d t he l a rges t C o n d i t i o n I n d e x is u n d e r 3 .0) . 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. I, 2002 
120 A. Budros 
References 
A l l i s o n , P . ( 1 9 8 5 ) . Event history analysis. T h o u s a n d O a k s , C A : S a g e . 
A m b u r g e y , T . , D a w n , K . , & B a r n e t t , W . (1993 ) . R e s e t t i n g t he c lock : T h e 
d y n a m i c s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a n g e a n d f a i l u r e . Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 38, 5 1 - 7 3 . 
B a l d r i d g e , J. , Cur t i s , D . , E c k e r , G. , & R i l ey , G . ( 1980 ) . Policy making and 
effective leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
B a n t e l , K . & J a c k s o n , S. ( 1 9 8 9 ) . T o p m a n a g e m e n t a n d i n n o v a t i o n s in 
b a n k i n g : D o e s t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e t o p t e a m m a k e a d i f f e r e n c e ? Strategic 
Management Journal, 10, 1 0 7 - 1 2 4 . 
B e n s o n , K . ( 1 9 7 5 ) . T h e i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l n e t w o r k as a p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y . 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 20, 2 2 8 - 2 4 9 . 
B i l l i n g , Y . & A l v e s s o n , M . ( 1 9 9 4 ) . Gender, managers, and organizations. 
B e r l i n : W a l t e r d e G r u y t e r . 
Birnbaum, R. (1988). How colleges work: The cybernetics of academic 
organization and leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
B i r n b a u m , R . ( 1 9 8 9 a ) . T h e i m p l i c i t l e a d e r s h i p t h e o r i e s o f c o l l e g e a n d 
u n i v e r s i t y p r e s i d e n t s . Review of Higher Education, 12, 1 2 5 - 1 3 6 . 
B i r n b a u m , R . ( 1 9 8 9 b ) . P r e s i d e n t i a l s u c c e s s i o n a n d ins t i tu t iona l f u n c t i o n i n g 
in h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n . Journal of Higher Education, 60, 123—135. 
B l a l o c k , H . ( 1 9 7 9 ) . Social statistics. N e w Y o r k , N Y : M c G r a w - H i l l . 
Blau, P. (1973). The organization of academic work. New York, NY: John 
W i l e y & S o n s . 
B o e k e r , W . ( 1 9 9 7 ) . S t r a t e g i c c h a n g e : T h e i n f l u e n c e o f m a n a g e r i a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l g r o w t h . Academy of Management Journal, 
40, 1 5 2 - 1 7 0 . 
B r a d s h a w , Y . ( 1 9 8 7 ) . U r b a n i z a t i o n a n d u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t : A g l o b a l s t udy 
o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n , u r b a n b i a s , a n d e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c y . American 
Sociological Review, 52, 2 2 4 - 2 3 9 . 
C a m e r o n , D . ( 1 9 9 1 ) . More than an academic question: Universities, 
government, and public policy in Canada. H a l i f a x , N S : Ins t i tu te f o r R e s e a r c h 
o n P u b l i c P o l i c y . 
C h a b o t a r , K . & H o n a n , J. ( 1 9 9 0 ) . C o p i n g w i t h r e t r e n c h m e n t : S t r a t eg i e s a n d 
tac t i cs . Change, 22, 2 8 - 3 4 . 
C h a f f e e , E . ( 1 9 8 4 ) . S u c c e s s f u l s t r a t e g i c m a n a g e m e n t in s m a l l p r i v a t e 
c o l l e g e s . Journal of Higher Education, 55, 2 1 2 - 2 4 1 . 
C l a r k , B . ( 1 9 7 3 ) . T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s a g a i n h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n . 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 1 7 8 - 1 8 4 . 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. 1, 2002 
Do University Presidents Make a Difference ? 121 
C o h e n , M . & M a r c h , J. ( 1974 ) . Leadership and ambiguity: The American 
college president. N e w Y o r k , N Y : M c G r a w - H i l l . 
C o r s o n , J. ( 1 9 6 0 , 1 9 7 5 ) . Governance of colleges and universities. N e w 
Y o r k , N Y : M c G r a w - H i l l . 
C O U cal l s f o r n e w f u n d i n g in i t ia t ives . ( 1 9 9 1 , M a y ) . University Affairs, 8. 
C o u n c i l o f O n t a r i o Univers i t i e s . ( 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 7 ) . Financial report of Ontario 
universities, Vol. I — Universities. To ron to , O N : C o u n c i l of On ta r io Univers i t ies . 
C u t s h u r t o u r u n i v e r s i t y l ibrar ies . ( 2 0 0 0 , June ) . CAUT Bulletin, 1. 
D a v i s , G. (1991) . A g e n t s w i t h o u t p r inc ip l e s? T h e sp read of the p o i s o n pill 
t h rough the in tercorporate ne twork . Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 5 8 3 - 6 1 3 . 
D e m e r a t h , N . , S t e p h a n s , R. , & T a y l o r , R . ( 1967 ) . Power, presidents, and 
professors. N e w Y o r k , N Y : B a s i c . 
D e n n i s o n , J. & G a l l a g h e r , P . ( 1 9 8 6 ) . Canada's community colleges: A 
critical Analysis. V a n c o u v e r , B C : U n i v e r s i t y of Br i t i sh C o l u m b i a P r e s s . 
D e v i n e , J. ( 1 9 8 3 ) . F i s c a l p o l i c y a n d c l a s s i n c o m e i n e q u a l i t y . American 
Sociological Review, 48, 6 0 6 - 6 2 2 . 
D u f f y , A . ( 1 9 9 5 , D e c e m b e r 24) . T h r e e un ive r s i t i e s p l a n 2 0 % h ike . Toronto 
Star, p. A7. 
F i n k e l s t e i n , S . & H a m b r i c k , D . ( 1 9 9 6 ) . Strategic leadership: Top 
executives and their effects on organizations. M i n n e a p o l i s / S t . Pau l , M N : W e s t 
P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y . 
F i s h e r , J. ( 1 9 8 4 ) . Power of the presidency. N e w Y o r k , N Y : M a c m i l l a n . 
F l i g s t e i n , N . ( 1 9 9 0 ) . The transformation of corporate control. C a m b r i d g e , 
M A : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P res s . 
F o r d , C . ( 1 9 9 4 , A p r i l ) . B u d g e t i m p a c t o n u n i v e r s i t i e s s t i l l u n c l e a r . 
University Affairs, 17. 
G a t e s , G . ( 1 9 9 7 ) . I s o m o r p h i s m , h o m o g e n e i t y , a n d r a t i o n a l i s m in U n i v e r s i t y 
r e t r e n c h m e n t . Review of Higher Education, 20, 2 5 3 - 2 7 5 . 
G i l l e y , J . , F u l m e r , K . , & R e i t h l i n g s h o e f e r , S . ( 1 9 8 6 ) . Searching for 
academic excellence: Twenty colleges and universities on the move and their 
leaders. N e w Y o r k , N Y : M a c m i l l a n . 
G l e n n y , L. , S h e a , S., R u y l e , J. & F r e s c h i , K . ( 1976 ) . Presidents confront 
reality. S a n F r a n c i s c o , C A : J o s s e y - B a s s . 
G r a y , H . ( 1 9 9 8 ) . O n t h e h i s t o r y o f g i a n t s . I n W . B o w a n & H . S h a p i r o 
( E d s . ) , U n i v e r s i t i e s a n d t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p ( p p . 1 0 1 - 1 1 8 ) . P r i n c e t o n , M A : 
P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 
G r o s s , E . & G r a m b s c h , P. ( 1 9 6 8 ) . University goals and academic power. 
W a s h i n g t o n , D C : A m e r i c a n C o u n c i l o n E d u c a t i o n . 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. I, 2002 
122 A. Budros 
G r o s s , E . & G r a m b s c h , P . ( 1 9 7 1 ) . Changes in university organization, 
1964-1971. N e w Y o r k , N Y : M c G r a w - H i l l . 
G u m p o r t , P . ( 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e c o n t e s t e d t e r ra in o f a c a d e m i c p r o g r a m r e d u c t i o n . 
Journal of Higher Education, 64, 2 8 3 - 3 1 1 . 
G w y n , R . ( 1 9 9 6 , J a n u a r y ) . H o w wi l l l a i d - o f f w o r k e r s b u y the i r e m p l o y e r s ' 
p r o d u c t s ? CAUT Bulletin, 5. 
H a m b r i c k , D . & M a s o n , P . ( 1 9 8 4 ) . U p p e r e c h e l o n s : T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n as a 
r e f l e c t i o n o f i ts t o p m a n a g e r s . Academy of Management Review, 9, 1 9 3 - 2 0 6 . 
H a r d y , C . ( 1 9 9 6 ) . The politics of collegiality: Retrenchment strategies in 
Canadian universities. M o n t r e a l , Q C : M c G i l l - Q u e e n ' s U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 
H a r r i m a n , A . ( 1 9 9 6 ) . Women/men/management. W e s t p o r t , C T : P r a e g e r . 
J e n c k s , C . & R e i s m a n , D . ( 1 9 6 8 ) . The academic revolution. C h i c a g o , IL: 
U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s . 
H a u n s c h i l d , P . ( 1 9 9 3 ) . I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i m i t a t i o n : T h e i m p a c t o f 
i n t e r l o c k s o n c o r p o r a t e a c q u i s i t i o n ac t iv i ty . Administrative Science Quarterly, 
38, 5 6 4 - 5 9 2 . 
H o d g k i n s o n , H . ( 1 9 7 1 ) . T h e n e x t d e c a d e . In H . H o d g k i n s o n & L . M e e t h 
(Eds.), Power and authority (ch. 9). San Francisco,CA: Jossey-Bass. 
K a n t e r , R. (1977) . Men and women of the corporation. N e w York , N Y : Basic . 
K a y , F . & H a g a n , J. ( 1 9 9 8 ) . R a i s i n g t he bar : T h e g e n d e r s t r a t i f i ca t ion of 
l a w - f i r m cap i t a l . American Sociological Review, 63, 7 2 8 - 7 4 3 . 
K e a s t , D . ( 1 9 9 6 ) . V a l u e s in t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g o f C E O s i n p u b l i c 
c o l l e g e s . Canadian Journal of Higher Education, 26, 1 - 3 4 . 
K e r r , C . ( 1 9 6 3 ) . The uses of the university. N e w Y o r k , N Y : H a r p e r . 
K e r r , C . & G a d e , M . ( 1 9 8 6 ) . The many lives of academic presidents: Time, 
place, and character. W a s h i n g t o n , D C : A s s o c i a t i o n o f G o v e r n i n g B o a r d s o f 
U n i v e r s i t i e s a n d C o l l e g e s . 
L e v i n , J. ( 1 9 9 2 ) . T h e p a r a d o x o f t he p r e s i d e n c y : T h e d i f f e r e n c e a p r e s i d e n t 
m a k e s in i n s t i t u t i o n a l f u n c t i o n i n g a t t h r e e c o m m u n i t y c o l l e g e s . Canadian 
Journal of Higher Education, 12, 2 8 - 4 5 . 
L e v i n , J . ( 1 9 9 5 ) . T h e c h a l l e n g e o f l e a d e r s h i p . I n J . D e n n i s o n ( E d . ) , 
Challenge and opportunity: Canada's community colleges at the crossroads 
(ch . 2) . V a n c o u v e r , B C : U B C P r e s s . 
L o r i m e r , J. ( 1 9 9 3 , M a r c h ) . F i n a n c i a l e x i g e n c y . CAUT Bulletin, 4. 
M a k i n g l a rge c l a s se s w o r k . ( 1 9 9 2 , Ju ly) . University Affairs, 17. 
M a k i n g t h e t r ans i t i on . ( 1 9 9 2 , N o v e m b e r ) . University Affairs, 15. 
M c G a w , R . ( 1 9 9 3 , A p r i l ) . F u n d i n g r e s t r a i n t s a g g r a v a t e w o r k l o a d w o e s . 
CAUT Bulletin, 4. 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. 1, 2002 
Do University Presidents Make a Difference ? 123 
M c G r a t h , E . ( 1 9 7 1 ) . W h o s h o u l d h a v e t h e p o w e r ? In H . H o d g k i n s o n & 
L . M e e t h (Eds . ) , Power and authority (eh. 12). S a n F r a n c i s c o , C A : J o s s e y - B a s s . 
M e l c h e r s , R . ( 1 9 9 8 , Sp r ing ) . O n t a r i o un ivers i t i e s . OCUFA Forum, 10. 
M i l l e r , D . & F r i e s o n , P . ( 1 9 8 0 ) . M o m e n t u m a n d r e v o l u t i o n i n 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a d a p t a t i o n . Academy of Management Journal, 23, 5 9 1 - 6 1 4 . 
M o r t i m e r , K . & M c C o n n e l l , T . ( 1 9 7 8 ) . Sharing authority effectively: 
Participation, interaction, and discretion. S a n F r a n c i s c o , C A : J o s s e y - B a s s . 
N e u m a n n , A . ( 1 9 8 9 ) . S t r a t e g i c l e a d e r s h i p : T h e c h a n g i n g o r i e n t a t i o n s o f 
c o l l e g e p r e s i d e n t s . Review of Higher Education, 12, 1 3 7 - 1 5 1 . 
N e u m a n n , A . ( 1 9 9 5 ) . O n t h e m a k i n g o f g o o d t i m e s a n d b a d t i m e s : T h e 
soc ia l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s t ress . Journal of Higher Education, 66, 3 - 3 1 . 
N e u m a n n , A . & B e n s i m o n , E . ( 1990 ) . C o n s t r u c t i n g t he p r e s i d e n c y : C o l l e g e 
p r e s i d e n t s ' i m a g e s o f t he i r l e a d e r s h i p ro l e s , a c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d y . Journal of 
Higher Education, 61, 6 7 8 - 7 0 1 . 
O n t a r i o g o e s a h e a d w i t h 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 f u n d i n g f r e e z e . ( 1 9 9 7 , J a n u a r y ) . CAUT 
Bulletin, 9. 
O u r a g i n g p r o f e s s o r i a t e . ( 1 9 8 9 , M a y ) . CAUT Bulletin, 8. 
P a l m e r , D . , B a r b e r , B . , Z h o u , X . , & S o y s a l , Y . ( 1 9 9 5 ) . T h e f r i e n d l y a n d 
p r e d a t o r y a c q u i s i t i o n o f l a r g e U . S . c o r p o r a t i o n s in t h e 1 9 6 0 s : T h e o t h e r 
c o n t e s t e d te r ra in . American Sociological Review, 60, 4 6 9 - 4 9 9 . 
P e t e r s , D . ( 1 9 9 5 , M a y ) . C u t b a c k s a n d r e t r e n c h m e n t . CAUT Bulletin, 2. 
P f e f f e r , J. & Sa l anc ik , G. ( 1978 ) . The external control of organizations: A 
resource dependence perspective. N e w Y o r k , N Y : H a r p e r & R o w . 
R e i s m a n , D . ( 1 9 7 0 ) . P r e d i c a m e n t s in the c a r e e r of the c o l l e g e p r e s iden t . In 
C . K r u y t b o s c h & S. M e s s i n g e r (Eds . ) , The state of the university: Authority and 
change (pp . 7 3 - 8 6 ) . B e v e r l y Hi l l s , C A : S a g e . 
R e n n e r , K . ( 1 9 8 6 ) . C a r e e r a l t e r n a t i v e s : P r o v i d i n g a c a f e t e r i a o f c h o i c e s 
t h r o u g h c a r e e r a l t e r n a t i v e do l la r s . Research in Higher Education, 25, 2 2 7 - 2 4 4 . 
R e n n e r , K . ( 1 9 8 8 ) . R e p l a c i n g r e t r e n c h m e n t w i t h d y n a m i s m t h r o u g h a 
p r o g r a m o f c a r e e r a l t e rna t ives . Canadian Psychology, 29, 3 4 2 - 5 4 . 
R h o a d e s , G . ( 1 9 9 8 ) . Managed professionals: Unionized faculty and 
restructuring academic labor. A l b a n y , N Y : S ta te Un ive r s i t y o f N e w Y o r k Press . 
R u s s e l l , M . ( 1 9 9 8 , O c t o b e r ) . U n i v e r s i t y r e v e n u e fa l l s in 1 9 9 6 - 9 7 . CAUT 
Bulletin, 6. 
S c h u s t e r , J . , S m i t h , D . , K o r a k , K . , & Y a m a d a , M . ( 1 9 9 4 ) . Strategic 
governance: How to make big decisions better. P h o e n i x , A Z : O r y x . 
S h a p i r o , H . ( 1 9 9 8 ) . U n i v e r s i t y p r e s i d e n t s — T h e n a n d n o w . In W . B o w a n 
& H . S h a p i r o (Eds . ) , Universities and their leadership (pp . 6 5 - 1 0 0 ) . P r i n c e t o n , 
M A : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P res s . 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. I, 2002 
124 A. Budros 
S i b l e y , W . ( 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e u n i v e r s i t y in t h e 1990s : C r i s i s o r p r e d i c a m e n t ? 
Canadian Journal of Higher Education, 23, 114—132. 
S k o l n i k , M . ( 1 9 8 6 ) . I f t he cu t is so d e e p , w h e r e is the b l o o d ? P r o b l e m s in 
r e s e a r c h o n t h e e f f e c t s o f f i n a n c i a l res t ra in t . Review of Higher Education, 9, 
4 3 5 - 4 5 5 . 
S k o l n i k , M . ( 1 9 8 7 ) . T h e she l l g a m e c a l l e d s y s t e m r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n : T h e 
po l i t i c s a n d e c o n o m i c s o f r e t r e n c h m e n t in the O n t a r i o un ive r s i ty sy s t em. Higher 
Education, 16, 1 5 5 - 1 7 1 . 
S k o l n i k , M . & R o w a n , N . (1984) . Please, sir, I want some more: Canadian 
universities and financial restraint. T o r o n t o , O N : O I S E Press . 
S l a u g h t e r , S. ( 1 9 9 3 ) . R e t r e n c h m e n t in the 1980s: T h e po l i t i c s o f p r e s t i g e 
a n d g e n d e r , iournal of Higher Education, 64, 2 5 0 - 2 8 2 . 
Soc i a l con t rac t . ( 1 9 9 3 , S e p t e m b e r ) . CAUT Bulletin, 1. 
S t e f f e n s m e i e r , D . & D e m u t h , S. (2000) . E thn ic i ty a n d s e n t e n c i n g o u t c o m e s 
in U . S . f e d e r a l cour t s : W h o is p u n i s h e d m o r e h a r s h l y ? American Sociological 
Review, 65, 7 0 5 - 7 2 9 . 
S toke , H . ( 1 9 5 9 ) . The American college president. N e w Y o r k , N Y : H a r p e r . 
S u m m a r y o f O n t a r i o ' s s o c i a l c o n t r a c t a g r e e m e n t s . ( 1 9 9 3 , D e c e m b e r ) . 
CAUT Bulletin, 3. 
T h e t h o r n y p r o b l e m of sess iona l s . ( 1 9 9 0 , F e b r u a r y ) . CAUT Bulletin, 11. 
T i p s a n d t e c h n i q u e s f o r t e a c h i n g l a r g e c l a s s e s . ( 1 9 9 1 , D e c e m b e r ) . 
University Affairs, 17. 
U n i v e r s i t y f u n d i n g . ( 1 9 9 1 , Ju ly) . University Affairs, 9. 
U s e e m , M . ( 1 9 9 3 ) . Executive defense. C a m b r i d g e , M A : H a r v a r d 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 
U z z i , B . ( 1 9 9 6 ) . E m b e d d e d n e s s a n d e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e : T h e n e t w o r k 
e f f e c t . American Sociological Review, 61, 6 7 4 - 6 9 8 . 
V a u g h a n , G . ( 1 9 8 6 ) . The community college president. N e w Y o r k , N Y : 
M a c m i l l a n . 
W a c j m a n , J. ( 1 9 9 8 ) . Managing like a man: Men and women in corporate 
management. U n i v e r s i t y Pa rk , P A : P e n n s y l v a n i a S ta te U n i v e r s i t y P ress . 
Who's Who in Canada (90 th ed . ) . ( 1999) . T o r o n t o , O N : In te rna t iona l P ress . 
Y a m a g u c h i , K . (1991) . Event history analysis. T h o u s a n d O a k s , C A : Sage . 
Z a j a c , E . & K r a a t z , M . ( 1 9 9 3 ) . A d i a m e t r i c f o r c e s m o d e l o f s t r a t e g i c 
c h a n g e : A s s e s s i n g t h e a n t e c e d e n t s a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s o f r e s t r u c t u r i n g in t h e 
h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n i ndus t ry . Strategic Management Journal, 14, 8 1 - 1 0 2 . 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXII, No. 1, 2002 
